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Abstract  
The articulation of strong evidence and moral arguments about the importance of social 
determinants of health (SDH) and health equity has not led to commensurate action to 
address them. Policy windows open when, simultaneously, an issue is recognised as a 
problem, policy formulation and refinement happens and the political will for action is 
present.  We report on qualitative interviews with 20 former Australian Federal, State or 
Territory health ministers conducted between September 2011 and January 2012 concerning 
their views about how and why the windows of policy opportunity on the SDH did or did not 
open during their tenure. 
Almost all ex-health ministers were aware of the existence of health inequalities and SDH but 
their complexity meant that this awareness rarely crystalised into a clear problem other than 
as a focus on high needs groups, especially Aboriginal people. Formulation of policies about 
SDH was assisted by cross-portfolio structures, policy entrepreneurs, and evidence from 
reviews and reports. It was hindered by the complexity of SDH policy, the dominance of 
medical power and paradigms and the weakness of the policy community advocating for 
SDH. The political stream was enabling when the general ideological climate was supportive 
of redistributive policies, the health care sector was not perceived to be in crisis, there was 
support for action from the head of government and cabinet colleagues, and no opposition 
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from powerful lobby groups. There have been instances of Australian health policy which 
addressed the SDH over the past twenty five years but they are rare and the windows of 
opportunity that made them possible did not stay open for long.  
Keywords: Australia, social determinants of health, health equity, political economy of 
health, health ministers, health policy  
 
Introduction  
The final report of the World Health Organization (WHO) Commission on the Social 
Determinants of Health (CSDH) consolidated evidence on the social determinants of health 
(SDH) and reiterated their importance in determining both overall population health and the 
distribution of health within and between countries (CSDH, 2008). Recognising that evidence 
by itself was unlikely to bring about policy change, the report also called on heads of national 
governments to provide leadership and adopt a whole-of-government approach to tackling 
SDH. However, the health sector was seen to have special stewardship responsibilities to take 
account of SDH in its own actions and advocate for other sectors to address the health 
impacts of their policies. Here we report on qualitative interviews with former Australian 
health ministers concerning their views about how and why the windows of policy 
opportunity on the SDH did, or did not open during their tenure. 
The Australian political and social context 
Australia has a liberal-democratic, federal system of government, consisting of the 
Commonwealth (national) Government, six State and two Territory governments (hereafter, 
‘States’). The Commonwealth government holds most of the revenue-raising capacity while 
States are responsible for delivering most public services.  Over several decades, national and 
State governments have been controlled by either the social-democratic Australian Labor 
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Party (ALP) or a conservative coalition of the Liberal Party and the smaller, rural-based 
National Party (Woodward et al., 2010).  
State governments manage public hospitals and other public health services and the 
Commonwealth funds general medical practice. In 1984 a federal Labor Government 
introduced Medicare, a universal public health insurance scheme which has remained central 
to the health system despite measures introduced by subsequent Coalition governments which 
have increased reliance on private health insurance (Duckett, 2007). The potential for 
differences of ideology and political interest between levels of government, along with the 
division of responsibilities for health, have provided fertile ground for blame-shifting and 
regulatory complexity (Woodward et al., 2010).  
Despite State and Commonwealth interventions over several decades, and gains in land rights 
and political recognition, significant gaps remain between Australia’s Indigenous Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples (hereafter, ‘Aboriginal people’) and non-Aboriginal people 
in life expectancy, chronic disease, education, employment, smoking and access to health 
services (AIHW, 2012). The relatively poor health of Aboriginal people reflects a history of 
colonisation, dispossession, paternalism and economic marginalisation.  A national strategy 
to ‘Close the Gap’ includes health service, education and employment interventions (Baum et 
al., 2012).  
Poverty (as measured by those  living on less than half the median income) has slightly 
increased in Australia over the last decade and in 2012 stood at 12.3% (ACOSS, 2012) while 
the peripheries of Australia’s major cities contain pockets of extreme disadvantage.  Income 
inequality in Australia has increased in recent years and Australia remains one of the six most 
unequal countries in the OECD (OECD, 2011) despite a cultural perception of egalitarianism.  
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Continuing health inequities 
Despite a history of evidence, enquiries and statements about SDH and health inequity 
(DHSS, 1980; CSDH, 2008; WHO, 2011), and while average life expectancy continues to 
increase, progress is uneven and inequities are increasing both within and between countries 
(Labonté et al., 2007; Stamatakis et al., 2010). In Australia, persistent health inequities are 
evident in the ten year gap in life expectancy between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, 
and in a socio-economic health gradient (AIHW, 2012).  Despite this, there have only been 
limited policy responses addressing health inequities and progress has been uneven across 
jurisdictions (Newman et al., 2006). Dahlgren and Whitehead (2006) noted that health 
policies often focus on increases in average health status rather than reducing inequities. 
Many (e.g. Baum, 2008; Blackman et al., 2010; Bryant et al., 2010; Carter et al., 2009) also 
argue that biomedical, individualised views of health excessively influence health policy and 
detract from actions to improve population health. Taken together, the long history of 
evidence on SDH and the failure to reduce health inequities clearly points to the need for 
research that asks why there have been so many political and policy failures in relation to 
action on SDH. 
Theories of policy making and policy action 
Exworthy (2008) elaborated on the complexity of taking policy action on the SDH by noting 
it requires a long term perspective, has trouble making attributions of change to specific 
policies, and involves decisions and non-decisions by multiple agencies and stakeholders 
with interconnected policy programs. Exworthy et al. (2003) and Collins et al. (2007) 
recommended a political and policy theory lens to understand why the policy processes that 
lead to action on the SDH have often been marginalised. 
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Theoretical perspectives of policy making as a rational process directly informed by evidence 
(Anderson, 1984) are not supported by empirical observation, and contrast with Kingdon’s 
(2011)  ‘multiple streams’ theory which argues that policy action on an issue is most likely 
when the three streams of problem definition, policy formulation and political will converge. 
In Kingdon’s view, prospective policies are drawn from a ‘primeval soup’ where ideas are 
constantly being developed and floated.  Kingdon also gave a central role to ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ who use any available windows of opportunity to advance ideas. He saw 
policy development as messy and driven by the ideologies and values of key actors. Lewis 
(2005) showed how Australian health policy networks are imbued with a bio-medical 
ideology, supporting studies on the ideological underpinning of public health policy by Tesh 
(1988), who demonstrated that ‘hidden arguments’ determine the nature of policy. In 
particular she highlights the individualism that is implicit in much United States (US) health 
policy. Consequently, modern policy analysis frequently follows Bacchi’s (2009) work by 
asking ‘what’s the policy problem’ and deconstructing the ways in which policies are 
developed from unspoken values.  
In researching the influence of evidence on policy in Canada, Lomas and Brown (2009) 
found that complex forces compete with research for the attention of civil servants and 
politicians and that research evidence is variably received at different stages of policy 
development. Other research has shown how research collaboration between academics and 
policymakers facilitates translation of evidence into policy (Best et al., 2009; Howlett, 2009), 
but it tends to underplay Kingdon’s insights about political support and timeliness as a vital 
feature of policymaking. Knowledge translation and knowledge exchange models appear 
naïve unless they can recognise the role of political will. DeQuincy and Reed (2007) argued 
that political will has been understudied in public health policy and needs more attention. Our 
qualitative study presents empirical information relevant to theoretical debates about political 
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and other factors influencing translation of evidence into policy. It reports on the views of 
twenty former health ministers about policy opportunities during their tenure to address SDH 
and health inequities.  
 
Methods  
Health minister interviews 
This study is based on qualitative interviews with 20 former Australian Federal, State or 
Territory health ministers, conducted between September and December 2011.  There were 
38 health ministers who met the study criteria: having held office for at least two years 
between 1985 and the time of sample (May 2011), and not currently in parliament. The 
research team identified initial contacts for 37 of these from their own knowledge, publicly 
available records via an internet search, or via the former minister’s political party. One had 
died and one was in jail. Direct contact was made with 25, of whom 20 agreed to be 
interviewed, four did not respond and one declined. Eighteen were interviewed face to face 
and two by telephone. Thirteen of these represented the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in 
government, six the Liberal Party, and one was an independent (in a Liberal government). 
Four were national health ministers and the remaining sixteen were from State and Territory 
jurisdictions. The final sample contained a higher proportion of members of the ALP than the 
original 38 but contained sufficient diversity to adequately represent the position of health 
minister within Australian national and State governments over the last quarter of a century. 
The interviews began with questions about the health ministers’ foci and achievements and 
their role in cabinet. Then, we asked about the respective roles of evidence about public 
health, SDH and health inequalities, and the role of medical professionals and interest groups 
in influencing their actions on policy.  A draft of the schedule was sent for review to Hon. 
 6 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Monique Begin, Canadian Federal Health Minister between 1977 and 1984, a Commissioner 
on the CSDH, and social science academic. Her review resulted in some revisions and the 
introduction of an additional set of questions about the media. All interviews were conducted 
by PL who drew on his knowledge and experience of Australian health policy. Prior to each 
interview he researched policy documents relevant to that minister to ensure probing 
questions and an informed discussion of each minister’s period in office. Interviews lasted 40 
to 90 minutes, with most approximately 60 minutes. We recognise the potential limitations of 
interviews identified by Patton (2002: 306) including possible distortion due to personal or 
political bias, or recall error which may also be influenced by the length of time since the 
events discussed occurred. However, we also note that subjects in this research are often 
discussing events on the public record, used to being interviewed by people who check facts, 
and were deliberately chosen as former politicians no longer subject to the possible 
constraints of an active public office. A number of subjects have also written accounts of 
their period in office or kept diaries, which they may have referred to in preparing for the 
interview. Ethics approval was granted by Flinders University Social and Behavioural 
Research Ethics Committee. 
Analysis 
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim then sent as text to the relevant 
ex-Minister to read, approve and clarify where required. We then thematically analysed the 
transcripts drawing on Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) stages of familiarisation with data, 
development of coding frameworks using targeted and emerging themes, coding, and 
charting and mapping. Qualitative analysis software (NVivo 9) was used to manage data and 
organise the coding. Each member of our research team read all transcripts. Our coding frame 
was developed iteratively as we read the transcripts and developed new codes.  Each 
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transcript was then coded by two team members. After double coding, each transcript was 
discussed in detail by the two team members involved and agreement reached, involving the 
full research team if necessary.  Our thematic analysis was shaped by the theoretical 
framework of Kingdon which enabled us to code for accounts of the problem, the policy, the 
political stream of influences and the role of policy entrepreneurs, networks, values and 
ideologies. A draft of this paper was sent to each health minister for checking and advice on 
whether there was potential to identify people inappropriately. Only one minister requested a 
change and this was to shorten a quote to make the meaning more transparent.  
 
Results 
Ministers’ perceptions of social determinants and equity 
All former ministers claimed explicit awareness of inequalities in health outcomes or 
risk factors between population groups during their tenure; especially mentioned were 
inequalities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, or between low SES 
groups (or areas) and the rest of the population. Only a small minority used the 
concept of a health gradient driven by SDH and, of those, two commented that this 
awareness had developed since their period in office.  Only a very small minority of 
interviewees spoke in explicit terms about health being determined through combined 
effects of multiple social factors; or about structural, economic and social factors 
influencing the distribution of social advantage/disadvantage and health across 
populations. Again, these appeared to be perspectives acquired or more fully 
developed after the period as Minister: 
It was a period before some of the broader social determinants of health problems 
began to emerge; for example, arguments about how public transport, housing, 
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related to public health, which has become of much more interest since that 
period. We were more concerned with, I suppose, a narrower view of preventive 
health. (Commonwealth, Labor, 1980s) 
Despite the 1980s being seen in this way as a period characterised by a “narrower” view, the 
only example (described below) of a minister really paying serious attention to the SDH and 
explicitly talking extensively about a social health agenda came from that period. For the rest 
of the health ministers health inequity was seen in terms of the poor health of disadvantaged 
groups and they rarely spontaneously used the language of SDH except in response to 
prompts and in relation to Aboriginal health.  Nearly all expressed strong appreciation that 
action on the SDH in relation to the health status of Aboriginal Australians was essential, as it 
could not be addressed through better targeted and better resourced health care services 
alone: 
Indigenous health was clearly an area where social determinants were far more 
important than any service the Health Department might or might not deliver… in the 
absence of really substantial investment in housing and infrastructure in the remote 
areas in particular there wasn’t going to be much improvement in the quality of 
peoples’ lives. (Federal, ALP, 1990s)  
Extent of action on the social determinants  
While nearly all health ministers demonstrated some understanding of the importance of 
SDH, they took limited explicit actions to address them in order to promote health or improve 
heath equity.  Table 1 divides the action reported into three categories: improving access to 
health care; implementing public health policies informed by an understanding of the SDH; 
and policy initiatives aimed at addressing and modifying SDH that sit outside the health 
sector. Only a very small minority reported action in the latter category. 
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One exception was an ALP State health minister from the 1980s who had developed a Social 
Health Strategy and a range of inter-sectoral work. The reasons for the successes of those that 
managed to take action on the SDH and the barriers to others doing so are discussed below.  
 
Table 1: Actions on health equity reflecting an understanding of SDH reported by health 
ministers  
 
Jurisdiction 
Improving access to health 
services especially for 
disadvantaged  
 
Public health policies 
informed by understanding 
of SDH 
Action on SDH 
State & 
territories 
Relocation of hospitals to area 
of high socio-economic 
disadvantage  
 
Needle exchange  
 
Adoption of Social Health 
Strategy 
Deinstitutionalisation of 
mental illness care 
 
Support for vulnerable groups 
in changing lifestyles  
 
Leadership of government 
social justice strategy 
Expansion of PHC services 
beyond medical care 
 
Harm minimisation as basis of 
drug policy 
 
Support for community health 
sector to take local action on 
SDH 
 
Improving rural health services Tobacco control measures  
 
Cross-sectoral human services 
committees 
Improving Aboriginal access 
to services 
 
Strengthening infrastructure 
and capacity for  health 
promotion  
 
Establishment of VicHealth 
and its work on health equity 
and SDH 
 
Health Rights Commission Healthy lifestyle campaigns 
 
Reforms to Aboriginal housing 
in remote communities 
 
 Nurse home visiting for 
newborns and targeted early 
childhood support program 
 
 
Common-
wealth 
Introduction of Medicare 
providing universal access to 
primary medical care and 
public hospitals 
 
National strategies developed 
in consultation with affected 
groups (e.g gay men and 
HIV/AIDs)  
 
Better Cities Program to 
improve urban infrastructure to 
promote population health 
equitably 
National rural health program 
to increase access 
 
Better Health Commission to 
translate WHO goal of health 
for all by year 2000 to 
Australia 
 
 
National Aboriginal health 
policies 
 
  
Women’s Health program 
 
  
Immunisation Program leading 
to increased uptake 
 
  
 
 10 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
Enablers and barriers 
Box 1 summarises the factors affecting action on the social determinants reported by the 
health ministers and these points are expanded on below.  
 
Box 1: Factors affecting action on the SDH 
Views on individual or structural determinants of health status 
Availability of convincing evidence necessary but not enough 
Political ideology 
Competition between interest groups influencing health policy 
The power of the medical lobby in the health portfolio 
Policy entrepreneurs and policy communities for SDH are weak 
The power to affect SDH often lies outside the purview of the health portfolio 
Political factors need to align and create window of opportunity for action on SDH  
 
Individual or structural responsibility for health status? 
Most of the contemporary discourse on SDH locates responsibility for health primarily in the 
political, economic and social structures and forces that shape peoples’ lives. Nearly all the 
ministers reflected current public health debates on the complexity of the interaction between 
individuals and the structures constraining their agency and argued the importance of tackling 
underlying causes: 
The problem is that if you don’t attack the root cause of why they got addicted in the 
first place they’ll be back to it in no time at all so you need those sorts of social 
programs that try to attack… or indeed you need to look at the individual, why the 
individuals go on heroin, and it may not be anything to do with because the kids 
around the street did it, it maybe something to do with some problem in the family… 
(State/Territory, ALP, 1990s) 
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A minority of health ministers (all from the politically conservative Liberals) explicitly 
framed the problem of health inequities in terms of individual responsibility: 
I sought to try and help, assist, source, both Indigenous Aboriginal organisations that 
were into preventative health – preventative ill health perhaps is a better way to say it 
– in other words, people taking responsibility for themselves with assistance 
(State/Territory, Liberal, 1990s)  
The ministers more inclined to action on the SDH were most likely to see peoples’ health as 
largely shaped by factors outside individual control.  These philosophical positions related to 
the ways in which they viewed evidence on the SDH.  
The role of evidence in policy-making 
Nearly all former Ministers said they were aware of evidence on health inequalities during 
their tenure, and many described it as motivating and supporting the kinds of policy actions 
outlined in Table 1. Within the cabinet, ministers described population health evidence as an 
important tool for making an argument for new policy, sometimes in the face of strong 
opposition from colleagues:  
Well it [evidence] was certainly pivotal for me because I needed to have a defendable 
framework to work from and if it wasn’t based on best evidence of the day then I was 
vulnerable because, you know, ‘why aren’t you doing this?’ or ‘why are you doing 
that when there’s no evidence to support it?’ (State/Territory, ALP, 2000s)  
However, a majority of ministers also took a circumspect view on the role of evidence in 
policy decisions, such as:  
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Evidence is a lovely idea but it’s got to actually fit with the direction or the trendy 
issues of the time or the direction of the government at the time. Evidence doesn’t 
dictate health policy, never has and possibly never will. It backs up policy directions. 
(State/Territory, Liberal, 1990s)  
Thus, evidence was seen as helpful but certainly not sufficient for success without timely 
political support; a view summarised by a minister who quoted a former Senator as saying 
‘never mind the logic, give me the numbers’.  
Ministers also explained that, for them, some of the most compelling evidence would specify 
solutions not  just problems, and while there was good evidence for the existence of health 
inequities, evidence was less robust (and more contested) on what works to reduce them: 
A good advocacy group is somebody who comes to you with the data, with the 
evidence, with the solutions… they understand the importance of being able to give 
government a solution that will work within their policy parameter…. 
(State/Territory, Liberal, 1980s) 
The ministers’ accounts are consistent with Kingdon’s view (2011) that evidence describing a 
problem, unless accompanied by policy options that are seen as feasible, political opportunity 
and powerful supporters, is unlikely to produce policy change. These forms of political 
pragmatism also appeared on occasion to reduce the range of evidence-informed policy 
options to those compatible with the ideology of those in power at the time. For example: 
The public health community has done nothing that I can see to dispel the myth that 
this desire, to have a Marxist command economy, and I’m being extreme. If anything 
it’s potentially counterproductive and it comes back to, I think – you know, public 
health is not enormously practical and, yes, there’s this great world movement on 
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social determinants of health but, you know, to what end? We’re all going to have a 
Swedish social democracy? I don’t think so. (Federal, Liberal, 1990s) 
Thus the ministers saw public health evidence as a necessary part of policy making but, not 
surprisingly, these former politicians were also conscious of  limitations on the role of 
evidence in the face of their political ‘realities’ and ideological values.  
Political ideology  
All health ministers’ accounts suggested that underlying ideologies affected the extent to 
which they championed action addressing health equity through action on the SDH. A small 
number made clear statements about supporting the redistributive role of the state: 
I take the view that health and education are the prime redistributive mechanisms 
today to look after people, not as a safety net but if you’ve got a brilliant public 
education, brilliant public health system then you’re well down the path towards 
having a more egalitarian society.  (State/Territory, ALP 2000s) 
 
Having had a look at a lot of literature in a range of fields, those things like poorer 
education, unemployment or areas where people have low control over employment 
…….the single most important determinant is inequality and that’s a set of economic 
policies and Australia has kidded itself  for quite some time that we’re an equal 
society.  (ALP, Federal, 1990s) 
Two ministers from the 1980s felt that the 1970s were characterised by a more wide-spread 
commitment to the idea of resource redistribution and regretted that this had changed in the 
ensuing decades. One noted:  
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I was a bit unfortunate in that I was there in the 1980s. In the 1970s there’d been a 
great spirit of generosity abroad but in the 1980s the bean counters were back in 
control, by and large… I mean people talk about progressive taxation now as though 
it’s creeping socialism… There’s no longer a commitment to redistributive income 
justice.  (State/Territory, ALP, 1980s) 
Federally, while the 1980s saw the introduction of some elements of a neo-liberal economic 
agenda – favouring market de-regulation, privatisation of government services, etc. – there 
remained a strong commitment to a socially progressive agenda by the then Federal Labor 
government. This was marked by the Accord – an industrial relations agreement between 
employers, trade unions and the government – and this broader policy environment provided 
the ideological support for the introduction of Medicare, Australia’s universal health 
insurance scheme. Thus the Minister noted: 
Medicare was central to the government’s economic program. It was part of the 
social wage commitment to the trade unions, part of the commitment to get restraint 
into real wages. (Federal ALP, 1980s) 
This was a clear statement of the role of the health sector in increasing access to health care 
within a broader program of action on social equity. These reforms rested on a broader 
commitment to social justice, pragmatically linked to an economic reform agenda.  
Competing interest groups 
Every health minister made it clear that their health policy agendas were ‘crowded’ 
(Kingdon, 2011) with many demands, and influenced by competing and conflicting interest 
groups. Each highlighted the dominance of the demands of the acute health care sector and 
described with regret how that constant pressure left them unable to take adequate action in 
 15 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
other areas. The State-level ministers were most pressured, being principally responsible for 
health service delivery in the Australian system. These comments convey the pressure 
experienced by nearly all these ministers: 
It’s acute services, always acute services, always the tragic case or accident and 
emergency or elective surgery waiting lists… I mean there’s a million of those and 
they always end up right smack dab on the front page with the microphone in your 
face. (State/Territory Liberal, 2000s)  
 
From what I’ve observed, the job of many Ministers for Health has been to keep the 
lid on things and put out the inevitable bushfires and even then it’s just pouring 
money into stopping the emergency waits and reducing elective surgery lists – you 
know, it’s all the acute sector because that’s where the media and the political noise 
of powerful stakeholders unite to get political action. (State/Territory, ALP, 2000s) 
Ministers’ accounts identified many specific ways in which the constant threat of an acute 
care crisis had crowded other issues off the health policy agenda or effectively prevented long 
term planning for action on social determinants.  
This meant that a policy area outside the provision of health care services was unlikely to 
surface from Kingdon’s ‘primeval soup’ without strong support from a minister.  Even a 
minister very strongly convinced of the importance of prevention recounted difficulties in 
bringing it to the policy agenda: 
I found there was a huge emphasis - I discovered on the first day as a minister - on 
the tertiary hospitals and on the emergency situations and on doctors being able to 
push their campaigns for additional funding based on care… I found that the 
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emphasis on prevention in health was almost non-existent. (State/Territory, ALP, 
2000s)  
Another lamented that despite their aim of increasing access to health services by reorienting 
the system to primary health care: 
…. you had these huge – I think it was the federal minister who called them 
‘cathedrals’ – built and expanded and expanded and expanded and it was ‘we are 
here, bring us the work’, not ‘take the services to the people’. I would very much 
indeed like to have driven the other model of ‘take the service closer to where the 
people are’. By all means of course keep the tertiary services in a tertiary setting but 
secondary particularly, and primary, should be where the people are.... I’m sad that I 
was never really able to do that. (State/Territory Liberals 1990s) 
Each minister recounted stories of how health became a front page story when doctors’ lobby 
groups spoke to the media about how lives would be threatened by a change to service 
provision or failure to allocate more funding to acute care from an already stretched health 
budget. About half described how, in this environment, their efforts and successes in public 
health could not compete:  
…it doesn’t change the fact that what will be on the front page of the paper is the fact 
that there was an eight hour wait in accident and emergency, not the fact that 90 
something percent of kids are immunised or that our AIDS infection rates were falling 
or all of that sort of stuff. (State/Territory, Liberal, 1990s) 
It seemed that, for these ministers, in the face of a very crowded policy agenda, the policy 
influence of the acute care sector and lack of comparably powerful interest groups arguing for 
 17 
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
action on prevention and SDH meant that policy in the latter areas was nearly always pushed 
to the margins.   
Medical power within health portfolios 
This dominance of the health portfolio policy agenda by the concerns of acute care leads 
straight to the question of who holds power within the health portfolio. Account after account 
described how doctors and their professional bodies, especially the Australian Medical 
Association, wielded considerable power over decision making in both Labor and Liberal-led 
governments, and used it to ensure the health minister’s focus remained on providing acute 
care services. There were many examples of this; shown most clearly by a Minister 
recounting his experience after deciding to close a trauma centre in one hospital and 
centralise services at another: 
Well, the doctors went berserk. Particular doctors went berserk and there was a 
demonstration of 2500 people at [location] Entertainment Centre, which I had to go 
along to. They wheeled out this guy in a wheelchair onto the stage while I was sitting 
there and they just wheeled out patient after patient after patient to beat me up. They 
did me enormous political damage to make what was absolutely the right decision. 
(State/Territory, Liberal, 1990s) 
It is significant that the minister who established a Social Health Strategy saw this as possible 
only if he first ensured that health care services were in order: 
One of the things I came to realise very early was that you had to have a reasonable 
degree of satisfaction with your hospital services before you could get too far with 
constructing a social health strategy that encompassed community health, public 
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health, let alone affordable housing and accessible education. You had to be able to 
demonstrate that the hospital system was functional. (State/Territory, Labor, 1980s)  
This insight appeared vital in light of the very many accounts of medical power which 
ministers gave; described by some as further reinforced by a history of budget allocation 
strongly favouring acute services in hospitals. This minister spoke of how hard it was to “turn 
the ship around” in the relatively brief term of a health minister: 
Again the inertia was the problem.  I mean, I was very strongly committed to the 
community health, health prevention, education approach. I fully identified with the 
people who said ‘Why aren’t we getting more money in this area?’ but again, of 
course, you’ve had 50, 100 years of the hospitals getting most of the money and how 
do you in fact divert some of that money away from the hospital system into 
community care, preventative stuff and so on? Not easy unless you can identify more 
money, additional money, which your colleagues may or may not give you, which can 
then go into prevention. (State/Territory, ALP, 1990s) 
A clear majority of State ministers mentioned that this problem was aggravated for State 
governments because health took up so much of the jurisdiction’s budget; meaning cabinet 
colleagues were very unlikely to welcome funding proposals for health-related policies 
outside the politically sensitive and expensive acute services, including on social 
determinants of health. As one minister succinctly put it, ‘there’s always the suspicion in 
Cabinet that it’s a cunning ploy to get your hands on some money’. 
Policy entrepreneurs and policy communities  
Kingdon (2011: 180-181) sees policy entrepreneurs as advocates for particular policies who 
have a particular claim for a hearing on the issues (such as expert knowledge or an 
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authoritative position), political connectedness or negotiating skills, and considerable 
persistence. In ministers’ accounts there were very few examples of SDH policy 
entrepreneurs with these attributes. A notable exception was the head of a social health office 
in the 1980s. Of her, the minister she reported to said: 
The person who I would single out above all would be [names person] who came in 
as the women’s advisor and then subsequently, of course, was the social health guru. 
She was a very clear thinker, very methodical, very committed… I had an extremely 
good working relationship with her and she was very influential in moving our 
thinking from looking at single issues to the generality of social health. 
(State/Territory, ALP 1980s) 
The minister described earlier as feeling that many public health advocates proposed 
impractical solutions did point to one advocate who he felt had been effective:  
I think in Victoria Vic Health has been extraordinarily successful and quite practical 
and we’re very lucky to have [names person] in this State… to me [their] success has 
been highly practical, very, very highly practical. (Federal, Liberals, 1990s) 
Internationally, WHO was mentioned as influential for a minority of ministers and Dr. 
Halfdan Mahler (WHO Director General 1973-1988) was singled out by one: 
I’d been enormously influenced by Mahler as the Head of the World Health 
Organisation, I’d met him a number of times both overseas and in Australia, and he 
was very much on this first wave of preventive activity. With Medicare we argued that 
one of the reasons for this lower status of health was the problems of access for 
poorer people so Medicare, one of the arguments for it, was that it would help to 
redress some of these problems. (Federal, ALP, 1980s)  
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Despite these examples, the accounts suggest that there have been very few policy 
entrepreneurs with a sufficiently strong power base to motivate policy making on health 
equity or the social determinants in Australia, especially in contrast to the effectiveness of 
powerful medical groups lobbying for acute services.  The successful SDH policy 
entrepreneurs mentioned were linked to some formal structure which had as part of its remit 
paying attention to SDH – a social health office, a review of preventative health and a health 
promotion foundation,  the WHO, or the CSDH.  
Policy mechanisms available to health ministers 
Nearly all ministers identified increasing access to good quality health services as the aspect 
of health equity most within their control. However, they also frequently recognised that 
many factors influencing health were outside the control of the health sector: 
There was always this ongoing thing about occupational health and safety being a 
matter for the Department of Labour and Industry rather than for Health and some of 
my biggest struggles in Cabinet were in that area. (State/Territory, ALP, 1080s) 
Thus a major limitation health ministers saw in their capacity to take action on wider social 
factors affecting health was that such factors largely lay outside their colleagues’ and the 
wider community’s understanding of what health ministers and health departments should do. 
Thus one Federal minister, when asked specifically about policy responses to SDH, 
responded, ‘Well I’m very aware but they’re not the sort of things that a health minister can 
immediately have an impact on’.   One minister who had been strongly committed to 
improving Aboriginal health acknowledged this when he reflected:  
The biggest issue they had, they saw, was lack of jobs. The medical service wasn’t 
going to fix that. (State/Territory ALP, 1990s) 
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A sense of powerlessness arising from this realisation was evident in this and other ministers’ 
comments, and is likely to be a common response when health ministers are lobbied about 
social determinants without due regard to the limits of their power to act. 
Political mechanisms to keep policy windows open 
Ministers accounts suggested that the political opportunities for advancing new policy were 
generally most favourable when the following elements combined: the health minister acted 
as a policy entrepreneur for the issue; both cabinet colleagues and Treasury showed at least 
no major opposition and preferably offered support; and there was support from their 
Government leader. They also suggested that this rarely happened for policy on the SDH. 
We can, however, learn from accounts of ministers who did strive to take some action on 
SDH about their commitment, careful planning and, for new governments, extensive 
preparation in opposition; although, once in government, support had to continue from the 
cabinet and head of jurisdiction. One minister described a wide-ranging health reform agenda 
but reported that ‘I found it very difficult to garner support for significant reform in Cabinet, 
with certain powerful colleagues unwilling to engage in any real way...’.  Others spoke of 
how they had won support for their agenda. One recounted doing this with their premier: 
The Premier needed to support what you were doing and any wise person would have 
– if there was something difficult or controversial coming up I would have gone to the 
Premier and said ‘Look, this is a priority for these reasons. This is where it fits into 
the overall scheme of things’ and hopefully it would enjoy support. (State/Territory, 
ALP, 2000s) 
Nearly all the Ministers described how gaining broad political support for ideas was vital, 
including on SDH. Broader support depended not only on the political benefit outweighing 
the risk, but also on the willingness of the head of the jurisdiction and cabinet colleagues to 
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accept even limited political risks. Two examples illustrate this. Firstly, a minister recounted 
how their Premier had been especially moved by the suicide of a 15-year old Aboriginal girl 
which led to the immediate opening of a policy window: 
He then said ‘Right, well, we need a whole of government response to this and we’re 
going to do something completely extraordinary’ and he did it.  He had hundreds of 
millions of dollars allocated in addition to the budget for remote Aboriginal 
communities…. [Premier] actually put all the services, child protection workers, 
police, improved health services, all of those sorts of things, into Indigenous 
communities throughout the state… I think that’s had a tremendously beneficial effect. 
(State/Territory, ALP, 2000s) 
The second instance concerned gun control legislation supported by the government despite 
very vocal opposition from community groups: 
Gun control was an unmitigated political disaster for the Coalition, absolutely 
unmitigated political disaster. Was it the right thing to do? Sure. Did we pay a price 
for it? You bet. (Federal, Liberal, 1990s) 
This is a very clear example of a government prepared to manage political risk because they 
believed it was the right thing to do; a stance consistent with the Commission on Social 
Determinants of Health’s position that action should be taken on SDH for moral reasons. 
Ministers seemed more willing (or able) to pay attention to social determinants and make 
subsequent political decisions when they either held more than one portfolio or were a 
minister of human services with a portfolio including health.  One example was the Federal 
Better Cities program of the early 1990s. Its benefits were noted by the Federal Minister 
responsible for it:  ‘It cut across silos and it was very successful in that way’.  State ministers 
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also saw their States benefiting because this program improved infrastructure in particular 
regions and was seen to have health benefits.   
The political importance of cross-sector structures was noted by a number of ministers. The 
minister with the explicit social health agenda chaired a human services subcommittee of 
cabinet considering equity issues across a range of portfolio areas. He saw this structure as 
enabling a more whole-of-government approach than might otherwise have been possible and 
noted: ‘You could actually sit down with four or five of your colleagues in a less frantic sort 
of atmosphere… That was a much more constructive forum in many ways than the full 
Cabinet’.  
More generally, however, it seemed either a lack of political support inside Cabinet or an 
absence of well-established cross-portfolio mechanisms could and did, in effect, limit policy 
opportunities for action on SDH.  
 
Discussion  
Our study indicates that health ministers from both Australian political parties can point to 
important health sector reforms (summarised in Table 1) that were seen to contribute to 
health equity. However their appraisals indicate that, with one exception, they were able to 
make little progress in advancing comprehensive policies to address SDH. The main actions 
they described were increasing access to health care services, and implementing disease 
prevention and health promotion programs in ways that took account of social effects on 
behaviour. Although in the latter case, it appeared that behavioural solutions sometimes 
overrode good intentions concerning SDH, akin to the lifestyle drift described by Hunter et 
al. (2010) whereby policies start off with statements about social determinants but end up 
with behavioural solutions only.  We found only a few instances of the health sector leading 
cross-sectoral action on the SDH. We are aware of more recent policy achievements in this 
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area (most notably the current Health in All Policies work in South Australia) but ministers 
responsible for these were still in parliament and not, therefore, included in our sample. 
The health ministers’ accounts are consistent with Exworthy’s (2008) explanations that social 
determinants are hard to act on in conventional policy-making environments because they are 
complex. Complexity science is increasingly drawn upon to examine the implementation of 
health promotion policy (Alvaro et al., 2010; Hawe et al., 2009) in terms of it occurring in 
systems that are non-linear, emergent, adaptive, unpredictable, dynamic and very dependent 
on history.  This is especially difficult because the SDH agenda competes for policy attention 
with problems that are more straightforward and do not carry the demand for complex, 
multifaceted responses implicit in the evidence on SDH (Exworthy, 2008).  
This study also indicates that responses to inequities depend on whether ideologies stress 
personal responsibility or the impact of structural disadvantage. This is consistent with Tesh 
(1988), who argues that politicians with a strongly individualist political ideology tend to 
support a health policy agenda focused on treatment and individual behaviour. Proposed 
solutions to health inequities are contested because they can be divided on ideological lines, 
contrasting with policies about health care which do not divide as strongly on ideological 
grounds. Even ministers favouring more structural solutions faced significant disagreement 
about what these should be. Figure 1 maps the relative success of different forms of health 
policy in Australia over the period covered by this research, seen through this intersection 
between the complexity of the problem to be addressed and the extent to which policy 
options are contested by decision-makers. Policies most likely to be adopted are those which 
are not complex and about which there is broad agreement.  By contrast, SDH policies, sitting 
in the upper right quadrant, have proved far harder to gain agreement on because of both their 
complexity and their contested nature. 
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Figure 1: Complexity and agreement shaping health policies 
 
 
All the health ministers consistently stressed the extent to which the power of organised 
professions within health, especially the medical profession, drove the health policy agenda 
and captured their attention, confirming other research which points to ‘medical dominance’ 
(Smith et al., 2009; Busfield, 2010). Medical power was evident across each of Kingdon’s 
streams. In the problem stream, health policy is dominated by the immediacy of illnesses 
requiring acute care services, with public opinion and the media strongly reinforcing this 
position. In policy, bio-medical paradigms propose a clear solution to illness. Generally these 
solutions are understandable to politicians and the community, which contrasts strongly with 
the complexity of SDH. Based on the ministers’ accounts, medical policy entrepreneurs are 
powerful, experienced players and not afraid to hold politicians to ransom through the media 
and during elections campaigns.  This ability to influence public mood and its impact on 
elections reinforces the point made by Kingdon (2011: 164) that the forces shaping policy are 
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far from equal in practice and that ‘The mood-election combination has particularly powerful 
impacts on the agenda. It can force some subjects high on the agenda and can also make it 
virtually impossible for governments to pay serious attention to others’. In the politics 
stream, ministers’ accounts suggested that advocates for the SDH hold far less power than 
most other players on the health policy field and are easily crowded out by advocates for 
acute health care services. 
Health equity concerns both gradients and disadvantaged groups. However, in Australia, 
potential policy solutions for gradients – generally requiring reduced levels of socioeconomic 
inequality ‘across the board’ – have been more highly contested than policies targeted toward 
disadvantaged groups (Baum et al., 2012). Thus we place them firmly in the right hand, upper 
quadrant of Figure 1. The limited record of policy action on socioeconomic and health 
inequalities by Australian governments – despite the long-standing evidence on the 
association between the two – may perhaps also reflect a degree of normalisation. As 
Kingdon (2011: 170) notes, ‘The longer people live with a problem, the less pressing it 
seems. The problem may not change at all, but if people live with it, it appears less urgent. It 
becomes less a problem and more a condition than it seemed at the beginning’.  This 
description seems to fit well with Australia’s policy record on the SDH. In Bacchi’s terms 
(2009) the SDH and especially concern with a health gradient have become silent in the 
policy field. 
Only a small minority of ministers discussed the need to flatten the health gradient, and then 
tended to focus on the need for redistributive policies across all portfolio areas and the 
political difficulties of these strategies in an age of neo-liberalism that favours market-driven 
policies. Ministers who held office in the 1980s noted that redistributive policies had become 
progressively less favoured since that time.  The lack of supportive environments for a SDH 
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agenda in the face of neo-liberal ideologies has been noted previously in Canada (Bryant et 
al., 2010), the US (Navarro, 2002) and Australia (Nutbeam & Boxall, 2008).  
Our study indicates that policy spaces for action on the SDH require that the rest of the health 
portfolio area is not perceived to be in crisis. Yet in the past decade health systems in 
Australia and elsewhere have been presented as such because of increasing costs of, and 
demand for, health care services (Australian Government, 2010; WHO, 2009). The accounts 
of former health ministers when faced with similar issues sheds light on the political 
difficulties in re-directing attention and resources to SDH, when such actions would not 
appease demand for resources from the acute care sector, and would  present their colleagues 
(and the public) with long term, complex and contested policy options. We found that there 
have been instances of Australian health policy addressing the SDH over the past twenty five 
years but they are rare and the windows of opportunity that made them possible have not 
stayed open for long. The political stream was enabling when the general ideological climate 
was supportive of redistributive policies, the health care sector was not perceived to be in 
crisis, and there was support for action from the head of government, cabinet colleagues and 
no opposition from powerful lobby groups.  
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